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RECENT DECISIONS
of the statements would not be subjected to liability as long as he
was not actuated by malice. 15 And, in construing what is purported
to be fair comment the courts will allow for idiosyncrasies of style.' 6
The instant case is clearly one of "fair comment." The plain-
tiff was a district attorney and such activities as were related to his
office were subject to criticism by his fellow citizens, so long as the
comments were not actuated by malice. No evidence of malice was
introduced in the case. This case, then, is fully in accord with exist-
ing New York law.
J. F. N.
TORTS - LIBEL AND SLANDER - LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL IN-
JURIES RESULTING FROM MENTAL DISTURBANCE CAUSED BY.-De-
fendant accosted plaintiff on a public street and angrily and loudly
called her a "God damned son of a bitch" and "a dirty crook." As
a result, plaintiff, being then seven months advanced in pregnancy,
suffered a nervous shock which led to further physical injury. Held,
these words not being slanderous per se, plaintiff's failure to allege
special damages was a fatal defect to her case, in the light of the rule
that there can be no recovery for physical injuries resulting from
nervous or mental disturbance caused solely by mere "opprobrious
epithets," however willful or malicious they be, and despite the fact
that defendant knew of plaintiff's weakened condition and intended
to cause her physical injury by his conduct. Bartow v. Smith,
- Ohio -, 78 N. E. 2d 735 (1948).
The instances where recovery has been allowed for intentional
physical injuries resulting from mental anguish induced by willful
or malicious words, not amounting to libel or slander, have been lim-
ited in the law of torts. As was pointed out by the court in the
principal case, such words will not give rise to a cause of action unless
accompanied by an invasion of the seclusion of private premises, un-
lawful threats, or menacing gestures sufficient to constitute an assault.
None of these additional elements accompanied defendant's words in
the principal case.
Recovery for such injuries caused by words so uttered has been
allowed where defendant ran at plaintiff in an angry and threatening
manner, cursing and shaking his fist at her, and shouting, "You are
fooling with the wrong person this time";' where defendants threat-
ened to send plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old school girl, to a reform school
if she did not confess to false charges of unchastity; 2 where def en-
dant insurance company's agent entered plaintiff's home and there
charged her with being a "deadbeat" and deceiving the company with
25 81 N. Y. 116 (1880).
16 Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. v. Citizen-Sentinel Publishers, Inc., 260
N. Y. 106, 183 N. E. 193 (1932).
1 Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916).
2Johnson v. Sampson et al., 167 Minn. 203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926).
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relation to sickness benefits; 3 where defendants wrongfully entered
plaintiff's sick room and there remonstrated with him, pacing up and
down the room and talking loudly and in a boisterous and obstrep-
erous manner; 4 where defendant was trespassing on the property
of plaintiff's husband and pushed his fist close to her face and "raved"
at her; 5 where defendant entered plaintiff's home and solicited sexual
intercourse with her; 6 where defendant entered plaintiff's home and
cursed at, and verbally abused, her for a considerable length of time.7
In cases where threats were made by defendant for the purpose
of enforcing payment of a debt, plaintiff has recovered where, in addi-
tion to stating his intention to do that which he was legally entitled
to do to enforce payment, defendant exceeded the bounds of his legal
rights by going further and willfully or maliciously causing unneces-
sary injury to plaintiff by his words, thereby stamping his threats
with the character of unlawfulness. Such recoveries have been made
where defendant sent plaintiff numerous letters in which he threat-
ened to garnish plaintiff's wages and accused him of moral turpi-
tude, in an effort to coerce payment; 8 where defendant's collection
agent called plaintiff a "damned deadbeat" and threatened to summon
the sheriff; 9 where defendant, knowing that plaintiff was convalesc-
ing from a serious illness, intentionally caused plaintiff's relapse by
sending letters threatening legal proceedings and stating that the
future credit standing of plaintiff's business depended on prompt pay-
ment of an alleged debt owed to one who had hired defendant to
collect it.10
Exceptions to the general rule set forth in the principal case
are found where recovery has been allowed because of a special re-
lationship existing between plaintiff and defendant, such as that of
passenger-carrier, 1 or guest-innkeeper,' 2 which relationship bur-
3 National Life & Accident Ins. Co. et al v. Anderson, 187 Okla. 180,
102 P. 2d 141 (1940) (reversed because of inadequate instructions by trial
court).
4 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California et al. v. Tetirick, 185 Okla. 37,
89 P. 2d 774 (1939) (reversed because of inadequate instructions by trial
court).
5 Stockwell v. Gee, 121 Okla. 207, 249 Pac. 389 (1926).6 Johnson v. Hahn, 168 Iowa 147, 150 N. W. 6 (1914).
7 Matheson v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 137 S. C. 227, 135 S. E. 306
(1926).
8 Lasalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424
(1934).
9 Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corporation et al., 210 N. C. 808, 188 S. E.
625 (1936).
10 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D. C., 105 F. 2d
62 (C. C. A. D. C. 1939).
11 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Clark, 104 Okla. 24, 229 Pac. 779 (1924);
Lipman v. Atlantic Coastline R. R., 108 S. C. 151, 93 S. E. 714 (1917); Sea-
board Air Line Ry. v. Mobley, 194 Ala. 211, 69 So. 614 (1915); Cave v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 94 S. C. 282, 77 S. E. 1017 (1913).
12 Emmke v. De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 8th 1923); De Wolf v. Ford,
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dened defendant with the duty to see to it that plaintiff was not
insulted by defendant or its employees.
An examination of cases of this type wherein plaintiff failed to
obtain relief because special damages were not shown bears out the
soundness of the distinction drawn in the principal case.' 3 It would
seem that the decision in the principal case was based upon the
peculiar manner in which plaintiff presented her case, which resulted
in a prompt judgment against her upon her amended petition and her
counsel's opening statement to the jury. It appears that her failure
to allege, as particularly contributing to her injuries, the fact that
others heard defendant's remarks, prevented her from being allowed
recovery on the authority of those cases which have awarded damages
for such injuries intentionally caused by defendant's publishing of
falsehoods, falling short of libel or slander, on the theory of an
"action on the case." 14
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio
in the principal case is sound, in view of the prevailing policy of the
law of torts, viz.: not to attempt to grant relief in any and all in-
stances where one is maliciously put upon by his neighbor. That
this does not correspond with the perfectionist's ideal is clear, but
weighty arguments against the latter are found in the evanescence
of damages and the possibility of fraud in connection with the bring-
ing of such actions.
R. C. D.
TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-REPRINTING OF LIBELOUS MAT-
TER HELD NOT TO BE REPUBLICATION OF THE LIBEL.--This is a libel
action brought by respondent based upon alleged defamatory state-
ment appearing in a book ' published by the appellants in November,
1941. Subsequent to this initial printing, there were seven addi-
tional printings, the last of which was distributed during a period
beginning March, 1944. Sixty copies of the aforementioned book
193 N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527 (1908), reversing 119 App. Div. 808, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 876 (1st Dep't 1907).
23 Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P. 2d 330 (1943); People's
Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413, 82 P. 2d 994 (1938); Maze
v. Employees' Loan Soc. et al., 217 Ala. 44, 114 So. 574 (1927); Republic
Iron & Steel Co. v. Self, 192 Ala. 403, 68 So. 328, L. R. A. 1915F, 516 (1915) ;
Beck v. Luers, - Iowa -, 126 N. W. 811 (1910); Braun v. Craven, 175 IIl.
401, 51 N. E. 657, 42 L. R. A. 199 (1898); Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y.
54, 72 Am. Dec. 420 (1858).
24 Musso v Miller, 265 App. Div. 57, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 51 (3d Dep't 1942)
(see citations therein).
2 "Total Espionage," G. P. Putnam's Sons, Books, Inc. (1941).
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